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Abstract. Defining various dishonest notions in a formal way is a key
step to enable intelligent agents to act in untrustworthy environments.
This review evaluates the literature for this topic by looking at formal
definitions based on modal logic as well as other formal approaches.
Criteria from philosophical groundwork is used to assess the definitions
for correctness and completeness. The key contribution of this review is
to show that only a few definitions fully comply with this gold standard
and to point out the missing steps towards a successful application of
these definitions in an actual agent environment.
1 Introduction
A formal-logical characterisation of deception and associated notions can
be approached with different methods. This review considers two prin-
cipal methods: formal definitions based on pure modal logic as well as
definitions based on agent architecture and communication. We will eval-
uate how the various formal definitions comply with the philosophical
foundations of this topic. Moreover, the respective advantages and dis-
advantages of these approaches are extracted and used to determine open
issues for further research. Putting it most simply, two questions will be
answered: Are the existing formal-logical definitions correct given the
philosophical background? And what are the problems needing further
attention?
Deception has been part of Computer Science since its very begin-
ning. The famous ”Imitation Game” proposed by Alan Turing to test
whether machines can think [58] explicitly asked for a machine being
able to deceive the interrogator. In more practical terms the topic has
not been studied until recently when computers became more connected
and the concept of agents and multi-agent systems emerged. In 2003,
the AgentLink community identified trust in agent systems as one of the
key challenges for further research [30]. This included user confidence in
trustworthiness of machines as well as trust in norms and social rules
among agents. As Jones and Firozabadi pointed out [23], trust in this
context means trust in the reliability to tell the truth as opposed to other
notions like trust in the abilities of others. Dishonesties in this domain
have been cause for concern, especially in such application areas as au-
tomatic trading agents (e.g. [54]), automatic negotiations (e.g. [43]) or
trust in the security of other computer systems (e.g. [56,3]). In particu-
lar, in open multi-agent systems where agents are free to leave or enter
the system, trust cannot be taken for granted as, e.g., argued in [57].
Since it seems to be established that trust is an important topic in
computer science and multi-agent systems in particular, a lot of authors
defined trust in a logical-formal way [13,21,22]. This review, however,
will focus on the opposite: definitions of not telling the truth, of lying,
being deceived or related notions of dishonesty. Although being closely
connected, remarkably little work has been done to define these concepts
formally, as indicated by many of the authors in the field [35,59,48,36,40].
Summing up, it can be shown that trust is an important topic which has
been formally defined by many authors whereas the associated negative
notions evolving around lies and deception received comparatively little
attention.
In the following chapter 2, we will look at the philosophical work to
identify the necessary criteria that definitions of lying and deception need
to satisfy in order to be accepted. Chapter 3 will then review some of the
existing definitions based on modal logic. Chapter 4 reviews some formal
definitions based on other approaches. Finally, chapter 5 will summarise
and compare in order to determine open research topics of the area.
2 Philosophical foundation
Many of the papers introduced later base their work on philosophical
definitions of lying and deception. Even more important, philosophy has
discussed dishonesties for far longer than computer scientists and logi-
cians. Thereby it enables us to identify conditions and criteria that need
to be fulfilled by a definition to capture the underlying concepts correctly.
Unfortunately, no definition is universally accepted as different au-
thors indicated [32,44]. Almost every definition can be disputed to en-
compass either not all or too many cases. Moreover, the boundary be-
tween lies and deception is not unambiguous [1]. As recent as 2010, it
is claimed that philosophers argue about the right way to define these
notions [15]. Despite the ambiguity, we will try to find the conditions sup-
ported by the majority of philosophers. In the first section this will be
done for the notion of lying, in the second section for deception and the
third section will cover other similar notions defined by philosophers. To
illustrate the various concepts, the running example of an estate agent
guiding a customer through a flat will be used. In this scenario, lying
and deceiving may occur very naturally making the example easier to
understand.
Lying We will identify five conditions necessary to describe what con-
stitutes a lie. These conditions are based on those expatiated in the
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [32].
Starting off with a dictionary definition, the Cambridge Dictionary
says lying is ”to say or write something which is not true in order to
deceive someone” [6]. This definition includes the first condition, the
statement condition, meaning that a lie is only a lie if a spoken statement
or utterance occurred (defined e.g. by [10]). In the example, the estate
agent is therefore lying when he says ”I’ve been in the business for more
than 10 years”, although he knows he just started. He is, however, not
lying when he behaves and dresses himself as if he is an expert. Some
philosophers argue against this condition [60] maintaining a broader view
that even withholding helpful information should be considered a lie.
What the dictionary definition is probably doing wrong, is to assert
that the utterance must be false. This is best illustrated with the case
where the estate agent honestly believes that the flat has been renovated
recently although it has not. According to the definition, he would be
lying by telling the customer that the flat has been renovated recently,
although it is his honest believe. To exclude this dilemma, most philoso-
phers introduce the believe-false condition, where the liar must believe
the proposition he is saying to be false, independent of the actual truth-
value. This is reflected, for example, in the definition of J. Kupfer that ”a
person lies when he asserts something to another which he believes to be
false with the intention of getting the other to believe it to be true” [28].
Similar definitions have been given by I. Primoratz [38] or B.Williams
[62]. Some like Chisholm and Feehan [10] argue that a not-believe-true
condition is also enough which includes the case where the liar has no
believe at all about what he is saying.
Kupfer’s definition is also clarifying the role of the listener. First of
all there must be a listener, usually called the addressee condition [32].
Thereby cases of telling some wrong believe to an empty room or being
eavesdropped telling a wrong belief are not lies per se. Furthermore, the
definition highlights the intent-to-deceive condition which has also been
described by J.Mahon [33]. Our estate agent joking about the value of
the property by telling an exorbitant price is not lying, because he has
no intent to deceive the customer with this statement. Even if some like
R. Sorenson [55] or T.Carson [8] argue against this condition in special
cases, general adaptations should include this condition to rule out fakes,
jokes or play-acts [15].
The fifth condition is the demand that a definition should in no case
include the success condition, meaning that the intended deception was
successful [32]. Imagine the case when the estate agent lies about the
quality of the parquet and the customer happens to be a skilled carpen-
ter being able to judge the quality correctly. In this occasion he would
still think that the estate agent lied, so the success (or failure) of the
attempted deception makes no difference to the fact that a lie occurred.
It is interesting to note that none of the mentioned conditions state
that a lie is morally wrong [32]. As reasoned by Kemp and Sullivan this is
because morality is ”a synthetic judgement and not an analytic one” [27].
There are also other possible conditions for lying which are, for example,
defined by C. Sakama in [44]. Since he also gives formal definitions, we
won’t use his conditions to ensure that the standard is not biased towards
his definition.
This leaves us with the five conditions from the Stanford Encyclo-
pedia of Philosophy that a lie is only correctly defined if it contains the
statement condition, the believe-false-condition, the addressee condition,
the intent-to-deceive condition and not the success-condition or any other
restrictions.
Deceiving The Cambridge Dictionary defines deceiving as ”persuade
someone that something false is the truth” [6]. This definition shows us
that deception is concerned with the effect on the listener or receiver
of the message as opposed to lying which is focused on the dishonest
behaviour of the speaker. For this reason, three changes need to be made
to the list of necessary conditions.
As already indicated, the first change is to include the success condi-
tion. When the estate agent lied about the parquet, he did not manage
to deceive the carpenter. Deception would have only occurred if the cus-
tomer had believed the lie. As argued by Chisholm and Feehan in [10],
the proposition the listener believes after the deception does not neces-
sarily need to be a new belief. He could also be deceived by maintaining
a belief or even by being prevented from acquiring some belief (in this
case the success is that he continues to believe that the proposition is
not true).
The second change is to exclude the statement condition as reasoned
by J.Mahon [32] or L. Linsky [29]. Coming back to a previous example,
a knowledgeable appearance of the estate agent does not constitute a
lie. But if this is intentional, the customer could be deceived about his
expertise without any statement being made. Instead, a new criterion
called evidence condition is added. It says that the deceiving person
must provide some form of evidence which is the reason for the listener
to conclude the wrong proposition [19,4,31]. This ensures the agency of
the deceiving person. For example, if a friend of the customer told him
that the estate agent has a high level of expertise and the agent still wears
the potentially misleading outfit and the belief of the customer is solely
based on the friend, then the estate agent has definitely not deceived the
customer. In another example, the estate agent might even tell the truth
by saying that the parquet is shining brightly with the intention that
the customer concludes a high quality. Still, this is a form of deception
as evidence intentionally makes the customer believe something that the
estate agent does not believe.
All other conditions still hold for deception: the believe-false or its
weaker form not-believe-true condition, the addressee condition and the
intent-to-deceive condition (e.g. [31]). Some like J.Adler argue that de-
ception does not need to be intentionally [1]. But as most of the other
authors disagree with this position we will still use it as a necessary
condition.
As a result, we know that a definition of deception needs to fulfil
the believe-false condition, the addressee condition, the intent-to-deceive
condition, the evidence condition and the success condition. It must not
include the statement condition or other restricting notions.
Other notions The definitions of dishonest behaviours given by philoso-
phers are not limited to lies and deception, although being the main
focus. Other notions which have been considered are fraud, bullshit,
withholding information or half-truths. They became necessary as the
available definitions of lying and deceiving did not include all kinds of
possible dishonesties.
M. Simmons defined in [52] the notion of fraud. His definition essen-
tially includes a lie which is believed by the listener and therefore also
becomes a successful deception, combined with requirement that the vic-
tim uses the acquired information and makes loss of money or property
as a result. This definition shall not be used as a guideline in this review
but is given here because one of the formal definitions refers to it.
A more relevant notion is bullshit as it was denoted by H.Frankfurt
in [18]. Bullshit covers similar cases to lying with the difference that the
speaker does not follow the believe-false condition and instead neither
believes the statement to be true nor does he believe it to be false. The
estate agent bullshits, for instance, when he highlights the satisfaction
of the previous tenants even though he did not know them.
Another important notion is withholding information as e.g. men-
tioned by T. Carson in [8]. It is the failure to offer information that
would help to acquire true beliefs or correct false beliefs as long as this
result is intentional. For example, not telling that the previous tenant
moved out because of noisy neighbours is an obvious example of with-
holding information. In this case, the conditions for lies can be adopted
as well, with the difference that the statement condition is replaced by
the explicit non-statement that would have helped to change the belief
of the listener. Carson also mentions half-truths in the same paper as a
special case of deception including a true statement as evidence.
Although a number of other notions have been defined, mostly bull-
shit and withholding information will be relevant for the formal defini-
tions.
Altogether, this chapter provided a basic overview of how philoso-
phers define lies, deception and similar concepts. For lies and deception
we were able to extract a concrete list of conditions allowing us to check
whether formal definitions comply with this standard.
3 Modal logic definitions
This chapter will look at definitions of lies and deception in modal logic.
Using logic to describe these concepts is an obvious decision as it pro-
vides a very general expressiveness which is well understood and not
restrained to an application area. However, as standard propositional
logic is not enough to capture all the subtle notions, almost all defini-
tions make use of some kind of modal logic. By introducing additional
modal operators, this kind of logic allows for quantifications not possible
with simple true/false values (cf. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
[20]). Different authors use different sets of operators; for simplicity we
will introduce the five most common and explain less common operators
later when they are applied:
– Bip denotes that agent i believes the fact p. This does not say any-
thing about the underlying truth of p and just indicates the beliefs
of agent i. This operator and the following two often occur together
in a system called BIC which was e.g. specified by M.Colombetti
[11].
– Iip denotes that agent i has the intention to make p true. For ex-
ample, by writing IiBjp we can specify that the estate agent i has
the intention that the customer j believes that the flat is renovated
(=p).
– Cijp denotes that agent i communicates the fact p to agent j. This
includes any kind of spoken communication or utterance.
– Op denotes that it ought to be p, where p is any proposition. The
operator is e.g. described by B.Chellas [9] or A. Jones [24] and means
that in known environments it is ideally the case that p. For example
in the flat sale situation, it ought to be the case that the estate agent
is authorised to sell the flat.
– Eip denotes that an agent i brings about that p and was introduced by
I. Po¨rn [39]. It assigns the agency of i to the fact p, in the sense that
agent i is the decisive factor that p occurred or became true. Then
a friend of the customer told him that the estate agent is an expert
in his field, this friend brought about that the customer believes in
the expertise.
Authors of papers using these operators usually provide proofs or refer
to others who proofed that the logical system is coherent and fulfils a
number of desired properties. We won’t go into details at this point as
interested readers may refer to the original papers.
In the following, we will start to look at formal definitions of ly-
ing before continuing with bullshit, deception and other notions. Each
considered paper is evaluated using the conditions selected in the last
chapter. Within each group a chronological order will be maintained if
reasonable. Thus, developments and improvements over time can be seen.
Lying
B.O’Neill (2003) [35]. The first definition we will examine is one given
by B.O’Neill. In his paper, he defines and derives several properties of
the modal operator C for communication and subsequently defines lying
with the formula in equation 1. Starting from his previously derived
properties of communication he then shows that lying is a subset of all
situations which satisfy equation 2.
Cijp ∧ Bi¬p (1)
IiBjBip ∧ Bi¬Bip (2)
In an example, this might mean that the estate agent i is lying when he
tells customer j that the flat has been renovated (Cijp) while believing
this is not true (Bi¬p). As a matter of some rules governing communi-
cation it implies that he intends the customer to believe that he believes
the flat has been renovated (IiBjBip) and that he does not believe that
the renovation is part of his belief (Bi¬Bip).
It can be seen very easily that the statement condition (Cijp), the ad-
dressee condition (j) and the believe-false condition (Bi¬p) are fulfilled.
The definition also contains no notion of success and some intention. The
problem is, however, that this intention is not exactly the desired intent-
to-deceive condition as agent i is not intending that j actually believes
p, but rather that j accepts that i is telling his true belief (IiBjBip). By
adding this extra level of abstraction, O’Neill fails to meet this condition.
On the other hand he shows very well that besides the believe-false
condition, the weaker not-believe true condition can constitute some form
of dishonesty which he calls ’talking though one’s hat’. The according
formal definition just replaces Bi¬p with ¬Bip in equation 1.
As a result, we can say that O’Neill gives a well-thought-of definition
with a small inconsistency and manages to relate different levels of lying
in the formal definition.
M.Caminada (2009) [7]. This paper of Caminada mainly focuses on
the difference between lying and bullshit. In this context he defines lying
as given in equation 3. In parts, this definition is very similar to one given
by A.Tzouvaras 11 years earlier [59], but is more clarified by leaving out
unnecessary parts.
Cip ∧ Bi¬p (3)
His definition complies with the statement condition (Cip), the believe-
false condition (Bi¬p) and it contains no notion of success. However, it
suffers from the problem of not including anything concerned with the
listener, so that neither the addressee condition nor the intent-to-deceive
conditions are satisfied.
Despite the lacking expressiveness of this definition he claims that
the definition of lying is settled and well-defined. He mentions, however,
that the intent-to-deceive condition could be added but argues that this
easier approach is sufficient. Nevertheless, the formal definition as it was
given should be rejected for the named reasons.
C. Sakama et al. (2010) [48]. In this paper the authors try to formally
define lying, as well as bullshit and deception. The other definitions be-
sides lying will be given later for clarity reasons.
Using a similar logical framework as all aforementioned authors, their
definition of lying in equation 4 is the first satisfying all the conditions.
Cijp ∧ Bi¬p ∧ IiBjp (4)
It contains a statement (Cijp) to an addressee, the speaker fulfils the
believe-false condition (Bi¬p), the intent-to-deceive condition (IiBjp)
and no notion of success is included. The definition is therefore fully
compatible with the philosophical criteria.
In addition, the authors give more specialised versions of this defini-
tion which include the objective of the liar. They also conclude that lies
have to be as weak as possible to deceive the listener as they always in-
troduce some deviation from the truth (or from what the liar believes to
be the truth). That later binds him to his lie and makes him less free in
what he can say without contradicting himself. This observation is quiet
application-oriented and shows more insight than other papers. All in
all, this definition shows to be the most comprehensive definition among
those which have been reviewed, both in accuracy and profundity.
Bullshit
M.Caminada (2009) [7]. The first and oldest formal definition of bull-
shit is the one given in Caminada’s paper which already included a defi-
nition of lying. Since bullshit as a philosophical concept was only defined
in 2005 by H. Frankfurt [18] this is just one of two available formal def-
initions. Bullshit in Caminada’s definition in equation 5 highlights the
main difference to lying: that the speaker has neither a belief that his
statement is true (¬Bip) nor that it is false (¬Bi¬p).
Cip ∧ ¬Bip ∧ ¬Bi¬p (5)
Similar to his definition of lying, it also contains a statement (Cip), but
no addressee and no intention to deceive. In contrast to lying, this is
not necessarily a problem as Frankfurt’s informal definition does not
specifically contain these parts either. Lending the example given by
C. Sakama in [48], we can imagine that the estate agent is providing
a consulting service and is paid per hour or report length. This might
cause him to produce some bullshit according to equation 5 just to earn
more money but without any intent that the reader is actually believing
what he has written, since it makes no difference as long as he appears
knowledgeable.
C. Sakama et al. (2010) [48]. Sakama et al. present bullshit as a weaker
form of lying in the already mentioned paper. They actually give exactly
the same definition as Caminada (Eq. 5). Furthermore, they produce a
definition for ’intentional bullshit’ (Eq. 6) including the missing intent-
to-deceive condition (IiBjp) and the addressee condition.
Cijp ∧ ¬Bip ∧ ¬Bi¬p ∧ IiBjp (6)
Relating to their consideration about the impact lying may have on fu-
ture communication, they conclude that intentional bullshit should be
preferred over lying, if possible, as it does not deviate from the true be-
lief as much as a lie. This conclusion seems quite natural as people are
more likely to tolerate bullshit than lies as H.Frankfurt pointed out in
his work [18].
Deception
B. Firozabadi et al. (1998) [16]. This paper by Firozabadi et al. is
focused on verifying trade procedures by excluding fraud. Based on the
definition of fraud given by M. Simmons [52] they produce four different
possible formal definitions of deception (which is a constituting part of
fraud). In contrast to all other authors we looked at so far, they use
the modal operators B for belief, E for ’brings about’ and a derived
operator H for ’attempts to bring about’. The latter was first introduced
by F. Santos et al. [50] and has the same meaning as ’bringing about’
something but without the inherent success of the action.
¬Bip ∧ EiBjp (7)
¬Bip ∧HiBjp (8)
Bi¬p ∧ EiBjp (9)
Bi¬p ∧HiBjp (10)
In the deception definitions (Eq. 7 to 10) they include the believe-false
(Bi¬p) or the weaker not-believe-true condition (¬Bip) and the decep-
tion is directed at an addressee (j) without the notion of communication.
Both operators, E and H, denote the agency of i and do not include
any intention. Therefore, the intent-to-deceive condition is not included.
Moreover, the H operator does not even include the success of the de-
ception, that is why equations 8 and 10 need to be rejected. The last
criterion asking for evidence is not included as well. In summary, these
definitions lack several of the necessary conditions and are not up to the
standard given by the philosophical literature.
A. Jones et al. (2001) [23]. In this paper A. Jones and B. Firozabadi
(the author of the previous paper) improve on the definition of deception.
Again, they use the belief operator B and the operator E for ’bringing
about’ something. Additionally, they use the already introduced operator
O for ’it ought to be that’ and another operator a⇒s b denoting that a
’counts as’ b given the context or institutionalised power of s. Simplified,
the operator which was introduced by A. Jones in [25] denotes a conse-
quence which is true under given circumstances. For example, getting a
plastic card with one’s name on it (a) ’counts as’ being a student (b) as
long as this is done by an university (s).
Their definition of deception in equation 11 fulfils all conditions ex-
cept the intent-to-deceive condition.
¬Bip ∧ EiBjEim ∧ (((Eim⇒s Op) ∧ BjEim)→ Bjp) (11)
It doesn’t contain a statement, but an addressee (j) and it complies with
the not-believe-true condition (¬Bip). The evidence condition is included
(EiBjEim and Eim⇒s Op) in a way that i brings about that j believes
he brought about the evidence m, while under the current circumstances
s this bringing about of evidence m ought to mean that p is true. The
success of the deception is included as well, as this allows j to reason that
p is true (→ Bjp). The missing intention to deceive is, however, only a
minor problem as this was one of the disputed conditions for deception
anyway (as mentioned in chapter 2).
G.Meggle (2000) [34]. Unlike the previous authors, Meggle uses a vari-
ant of the BIC logic to describe deception and associated notions.
IiBjp ∧ Bi¬p ∧ Cijm ∧ Bi(Cijm→ Bjp) ∧ (Cijm→ Bjp) (12)
The definition he gives for successful deception in equation 12 correctly
contains the intent-to-deceive (IiBjp) and the believe-false condition
(Bi¬p). It provides evidence (Cijm) which i believes to cause j to ac-
quire the new belief (Bi(Cijm → Bjp)) and it also covers the success
in the way that this evidence indeed causes j to acquire the new belief
(Cijm→ Bjp). The problem of this definition is, however, that it explic-
itly contains a statement condition which should be avoided to account
for deception by other means.
Furthermore, Meggle uses his definition to nest multiple levels of de-
ception (being deceived about being deceived and so on) and thinks
about implications for actual implementation. These considerations and
the good, albeit not perfect, definition contribute to make this a valuable
paper.
B.O’Neill (2003) [35]. In the already mentioned paper of B.O’Neill, he
also gives a definition of deception as in equation 13. In his paper he ac-
tually starts by defining deception, only to show later that his definition
of lying is a subset of deception.
IiBjp ∧ Bi¬p ∧ Bjp (13)
He correctly leaves out a statement, but has an addressee (j), fulfils the
believe-false condition (Bi¬p), the intent-to-deceive condition (IiBjp)
and the success condition (Bjp). Again, one condition is not fulfilled, as
no trace of an evidence is included in his definition.
C. Sakama et al. (2010) [48] In the same paper where they already de-
fined lies and bullshit, Sakama et al. also define deception with equation
14. They try to focus on the speaker’s point of view, thereby neglecting
some of the necessary conditions.
Cijm∧Bim∧ IiBjm∧BiBj(m∧¬Bj¬p→ p)∧Bi¬Bj¬p∧Bi¬p∧ IiBjp
(14)
The way to interpret this rather long statement is that i communicates
some evidence m which he believes himself and intents j to believe it
as well. He furthermore thinks that j makes the default conclusion that
p holds as well (as long as he does not believe that ¬p). Agent i also
expects that j does not believe ¬p while he himself does not believe in p
with the overall intention the j comes to believe p.
It contains an addressee, the believe-false condition, the intent-to-
deceive and some evidence. The problems are that it does not state at
any point that the deception was successful and that it introduces un-
necessary restrictions by using the statement condition and restricting
the evidence to propositions he believes himself (Bim).
Even though the definition lacks several of our criteria, the authors
do well in concluding that deception is even better than bullshit or lying
as it does not even require to deviate from the truth at all.
C. Sakama et al. (2010) [47]. In this paper of C. Sakama and M.Caminada,
the authors try a different approach to define deception by enumerating
all possible situations which might constitute deception. They base these
definitions on the work of Chisholm and Feehan [10] who differentiated
deception by aim, effect and knowledge. Besides the familiar operators of
belief (B), intention (I), communication (C) and bringing about some-
thing (E), they additionally use ’let it be the case that’ denoted by F .
This operator has a similar meaning to E , but with the difference that
Eip denotes that the agency of i changes p, while Fip means that the
agency of i allows p to continue to be what it was before.
The definitions in equations 15 to 22 can be summarised as telling or
not telling something which causes the listener to start believing, con-
tinue believing, cease not believing or being prevented from not believing
some proposition.
Bi¬p ∧ Cijp→ EiBjp (15)
Bi¬p ∧ Cijp→ FiBjp (16)
Bi¬p ∧ Cijp→ Ei¬Bj¬p (17)
Bi¬p ∧ Cijp→ Fi¬Bj¬p (18)
Bi¬p ∧ ¬Cij¬p→ EiBjp (19)
Bi¬p ∧ ¬Cij¬p→ FiBjp (20)
Bi¬p ∧ ¬Cij¬p→ Ei¬Bj¬p (21)
Bi¬p ∧ ¬Cij¬p→ Fi¬Bj¬p (22)
The eight definitions exist without or with the intentional part IiBjp.
By this they include the intent-to-deceive condition while not ruling out
the possibility of unintentional deception. They clearly also have an ad-
dressee and a believe-false condition (Bi¬p). Furthermore all possible
forms of success are included. At first it might seem problematic to
include the statement condition (Cijp), but by enumerating the same
equations with the explicit non-statement (¬Cij¬p) they actually show
indifference to the statement as required by the philosophical criteria.
The only thing that is definitely missing is the evidence condition.
All together, this definition stands out in its achievement to include
all the different notions which might be included in deception with the
downside that the evidence condition is missing completely.
Other notions
C. Sakama et al. (2010) [47]. Other notions of dishonesty defined in a
formal way were only embedded in papers of C. Sakama. One of them is
’withholding information’ which is defined in the same way as lying but
with the non-statement instead of the statement condition (Eq. 23).
¬Cij¬p ∧ Bi¬p ∧ IiBjp (23)
This definition can be considered as complete, since the non-statement
condition, the addressee condition, the believe-false condition and the
intent-to-deceive condition are included without using any success con-
dition.
C. Sakama (2012) [45]. This presentation of Sakama includes a num-
ber of his previously mentioned definitions and additionally a definition
of half-truths. Interestingly, half-truths have the same definition as his
deception definition in [48], given in equation 14. Presumably, he no-
ticed the shortcomings of this definition as deception and relabelled it as
half-truth which is indeed more appropriate given, e.g., the dictionary
definition that a half-truth is ”a statement that is intended to deceive
by being only partly true” [6].
Summary
After looking at a number of definitions in modal logic, we can conclude
that fulfilling the various philosophical criteria is not at all obvious. For
lying, only Sakama’s definition in [48] is fully compatible with the cri-
teria. For deception, none of the reviewed papers included a definition
which is totally correct. The definitions of Jones [23], Meggle [34] and
Sakama [47], however, are the most suitable with only one condition
missing in each definition. The latter manages to provide very subtle dif-
ferences by using multiple statements with the downside of introducing
possibly unnecessary complications. On the other hand, the definitions
of the minor notions of bullshit and withholding information seem to be
quiet accurate though not many tried to define these notions.
A problem which definitions based on modal logic have in common,
is that they are coupled to this rather complicated form of logic with
different operators which are usually not used in the application context
of agent design. Therefore, more work is needed to transfer the results to
actual agents, possibly by adapting simpler operators. This step might of
course damage the precision of the definitions but may help to apply them
in practice. Furthermore, research is needed to come up with logically
proofed methods to reason about when to use lies and how to recognise
them. Sakama’s considerations in [48] about the preferred way of using
dishonesty by deviating as little as possible from the truth are a first step
in this direction. On the other hand, the approaches introduced in the
next chapter might be more useful for practical applications after all, as
they already embed formal definitions within agent communication and
argumentation.
4 Other approaches to formal definitions
This chapter will examine other approaches and methods to define lies,
deception and other notions. These are mainly embedded in existing
agent architecture and communication systems bringing the advantage
of being in the application context already. Nonetheless, these definitions
can be written in a formal way to make them relevant to this review
and to allow comparisons with the previously presented definitions with
modal logic.
We will examine three examples to see how the definition can be
embedded at very different levels of abstraction. The first example will
look at a low-level approach operating on the belief base of an agent.
The second paper uses a mid-level definition operating on speech acts
and thirdly, a high-level definition will be given which is embedded in
abstract argumentation frameworks.
Subsequently, we will begin to look at a low-level approach before
continuing with higher level definitions.
Low-level approaches An intelligent agent usually has a continuous
update cycle of sensing the environment, updating the current beliefs
about the world, deciding what to do by using desires and intentions
and acting according to a plan which might achieve the current intention
(following the idea first introduced by M.Bratman in [5]). The belief base
of the agent which is updated in every cycle is the starting point of the
low-level approaches. This way they allow for similar flexibility as modal
logic while still being embedded in the agent’s sense-decide-act cycle.
One example we won’t examine in detail is given by F.De Rosis et
al. in [12], where they employ a probabilistic model to model the belief
base and define lies as a set of conditional probabilities thereupon.
We will look in more detail at a presentation of C. Sakama of 2012
[46] which is based on a previous paper of Sakama et al. [49] where they
introduce ’logic programming’ as a way to represent the knowledge base
of an agent which allows to include disinformation. By disinformation
they refer to all possible lies or bullshit given a certain agent’s belief set.
The simplified version presented here uses the pair 〈K,D〉 as the belief
base of an agent, such that K is the agent’s knowledge and D contains
all propositions that count as lies or bullshit according to equation 24.
∀l ∈ D,K  ¬l ∨ (K 2 l ∧K 2 ¬l) (24)
Additionally, the agent has the explicit goal to propose g although it is
not in the knowledge base (K 2 g) or to prevent g from being proposed
although it is in the knowledge base (K  g). For this purpose, the agent
can use an adapted knowledge base (K \J)∪I , where J ⊆ K and I ⊆ D.
Putting it more simply, the agent can ignore some parts of the knowledge
base counteracting his intentions (J) and add some disinformation (I)
enabling him to achieve his goal.
Lies, bullshit and withholding information are now defined using
these sets J and I (Eq. 25 to 27).
Lie, if I 6= ∅ ∧K  ¬l for some l ∈ I (25)
Bullshit, if I 6= ∅ ∧K 2 ¬l for any l ∈ I (26)
Withholding information, if I = ∅ (27)
Intuitively, lying is adding some additional information of which at least
some is believed to be false. Bullshitting is adding some additional in-
formation of which none is believed to be false (nor to be true, as this
would have enabled the agent to use the original set K without adding
anything). Finally, withholding information is leaving some information
out without adding any disinformation.
The statement, addressee and intent-to-deceive conditions are not
included explicitly in the definition. However, the framework implicitly
includes all three conditions as the whole process is aimed at using the
modified believe set to communicate p or prevent p from being commu-
nicated to someone with the intent to deceive (since communicating p
would not have been possible with the original belief K).
The definition of lying includes the believe-false condition and no
notion of success and therefore fulfils all criteria. The same holds for the
bullshit definition as it contains the indifferent believe and no notion of
success either. Finally, withholding information fulfils all criteria as well,
in this case by not communicating essential parts.
In his presentation, Sakama also gives some behavioural rules when to
use each of the possibilities, using the preference ordering he already in-
troduced in his modal logic papers of truth over withholding information
over bullshit over lies.
Given that he manages to give definitions complying with all nec-
essary criteria and nonetheless being incorporated in an actual agent
design, this approach is one that should be taken into account.
In summary, the low-level approaches share the problem of either
leaving out necessary conditions or including them only implicitly through
the framework they are used in. However, if this implicit inclusion is ac-
knowledged, at least the approach of Sakama in [46] fulfils all criteria and,
moreover, adds rules of how to apply the dishonesties in communication.
Mid-level approaches The next level of abstraction is reached when
the agents need to communicate with one another in a multi-agent sys-
tem. The communication can be of various kinds, e.g. deliberation, in-
quiries, negotiation, persuasion or info-seeking as defined by Walter and
Krabbe in [61]. The constituting parts of communication are speech acts
each consisting of a performative and the content, where the performa-
tive denotes the kind of speech (like requests, promises or assertions, see
the classification of J. Searle [51]). These speech acts, which are usually
defined in a generally accepted language like FIPA-ACL [17], can be
modified to accommodate for lies and deception.
The paper of E. Sklar et al. [53], we will look at in more detail, uses
a speech-act based approach to integrate lies in agent communication.
The main problem they face is the need to use the existing agent com-
munication languages which are designed for truthful communication as
pointed out by Parsons and Wooldridge in [37]. These existing languages
allow a finite list of defined performatives for speech act, that is why
no new performative ’lying’ could be added. As Sklar et al. argue, this
would not make sense anyway as the performatives are public and an
agent who is publicly announcing that he is lying cannot really lie.
What they are doing instead is to alter the existing pre- and post-
conditions of the performative ’assert’ to allow an agent to make false
assertions (i.e. to lie). The original definition of ’assert’ is given in equa-
tion 28 (based on [37]).
Locution: i→ j : assert(p)
Pre-conditions: (S, p) ∈ S(Σi ∪ CSj)
Post-conditions: CSi,t+1 = CSi,t ∪ {p}
(28)
It symbolises that i can make the assertion p to agent j when the argu-
ment for p including its support S can be drawn from the set of acceptable
arguments S of all arguments in the knowledge base of I (Σi) combined
with the already publicly uttered arguments of j (CSj). Afterwards, the
publicly uttered arguments of i are updated with p for the next iteration
(Post-condition). Based on this, Sklar et al. define a lie as the ’assert’
speech act with the following pre- and postconditions in equation 29.
Locution: i→ j : assert(p)
Pre-conditions: (S,¬p) ∈ S(Σi ∪ CSj) AND
(S′, p) ∈ S(Σi ∪ CSj ∪ Ji)
Post-conditions: CSi,t+1 = CSi,t ∪ {p}
(29)
The modified pre-conditions show that the contrary argument ¬p is pos-
sible given only the knowledge base of i and the publicly uttered com-
mitments of j. However, by adding additional arguments Ji which are
not in the knowledge base of the agent i originally, he can argue for p.
This definition clearly contains the statement condition (by using
the ’assert’ speech act), it contains an addressee (j) and the believe-false
condition ((S,¬p) ∈ S(Σi ∪ CSj)). However, the intention to deceive is
missing.
The authors indicate that the additionally used knowledge Ji needs
to be remembered and maintained for each communication partner to
ensure that the agent does not contradict itself. Furthermore, they think
about possible applications, e.g. that lying might be an easier option
when two different arguments are possible, one truthful but very com-
plicated argument and one easy but dishonest argument. Moreover, they
imagine the application area of negotiation where agents want to lie
about their personal value of goods.
All in all, speech acts allow for a higher level of abstraction and at
the same time for good definitions as well. The problem that occurred
in the paper of Sklar et al. and which might be a general problem for
this approach is that definitions are speaker-focused and do not account
for intentions to deceive or even deception which is solely focused on the
addressee.
High-level approaches Still another level of abstraction can be
achieved by constructing abstract argumentation frameworks as intro-
duced by Dung in [14]. They have the advantage of providing an easy
problem understanding as they are able to depict the situation graphi-
cally. On the other hand, we will see that the high level of abstraction
does not allow for unambiguous, clear definitions.
The abstract argumentation framework 〈A,⇀〉 contains a set of argu-
ments A and a defeat relation ⇀ between them. If one argument defeats
another, it contradicts either the original argument itself or one of its
supportive propositions. These argumentation frameworks are usually
used to easily construct the set of arguments that should be accepted, in
the sense that this acceptable set is consistent and does not contradict
itself. Several measures can be applied for this purpose (e.g. a grounded
semantic containing only the minimal set of arguments that need to be
accepted in any case). When applying this approach to agent commu-
nication, each agent might propose its own set of acceptable arguments
determined by their own knowledge. All publicly announced arguments
form a new framework where the overall accepted arguments can be
determined. Agents might have preferences over the finally accepted ar-
guments, which in turn are useful when analysing the argumentation
game-theoretically. Based on the argumentation frameworks, it is possi-
ble to define lies or especially withholding information as agents might
want to improve their utility by influencing the acceptable arguments by
adding additional arguments or hiding some arguments to break defeat
chains.
The paper we will examine here is by I. Rahwan et al. [42]. An almost
identical approach has also been described in their previous paper in
[40]. Formally, each agent i in this paper has a true type Ai reflecting
the true set of acceptable arguments given the agent’s knowledge and a
semantic. However, the publicly revealed type A⋆i might be different from
Ai. (Thoroughly honest agents always have A
⋆
i = Ai). Additionally, each
agent has a utility function ui(A
⋆
1 ,A
⋆
2, . . . ,A
⋆
i , . . . ) for the possible final
outcomes determined by the revealed types of all participants.
Based on this, the authors define their dishonest notions as in equa-
tions 30 and 31.
Lying: A⋆i * Ai (30)
With. Inf.: A⋆i ⊂ Ai
AND ui(A
⋆
1,A
⋆
2, . . . ,A
⋆
i , . . . ) > ui(A
⋆
1,A
⋆
2, . . . ,Ai, . . . )
(31)
It should be noted that the second condition for withholding information
(the comparison between the utility functions) was not given formally,
but in words.
Both definitions implicitly include the statement and the addressee
condition, since the evaluation of the utility function is based on the
preceding communicative act of each agent. One might also argue that
the intention to deceive is included as well, because the other agents
need to accept the wrongly revealed arguments which presumably is the
intention of the agent. However, the believe-false condition for lying is not
fulfilled as A⋆i only needs to contain additional arguments about which
nothing is known. Consequently, the lying definition might cover bullshit
and lying possibly even paired with withholding information. The same
problem holds for the withholding information definition in equation 31
as the higher utility does not suffice to show that the agent is inducing
knowledge it does not believe. The definition would fit better to half-
truths, as a true part of the knowledge is revealed with the intention to
increase one’s utility.
In the rest of the paper, the authors show that agents might have
an incentive to lie as a Nash equilibrium for the argumentation game
does not necessarily lead to honest behaviour. They conclude by propos-
ing that this should be avoided by using restrictive rules. Another nice
example for this game-theoretical analysis is shown in Rahwan et. al.’s
subsequent paper [41]. Also, other authors like M.Caminada try to use
abstract argumentation framworks to define lies and deception, but with-
out giving formal definitions [7].
Altogether, this high level approach showed to be highly ambiguous
when it comes to check the philosophical conditions. However, the prac-
tical implications for discussions and argumentation can be derived and
investigated more easily due to the high abstraction.
Summary Summarising the other approaches based on different level
of agent communication, we can see some common problems. Embed-
ding definitions in a context often either requires to assume implicitly
some conditions or to leave out some conditions completely. Moreover,
the definitions are fixed on the speaker, which is why no formal defini-
tion for deception was given. One the positive side, we can note the high
application-orientation of all approaches which has been proved by ap-
plying the respective definitions to sensible examples. Moreover, higher
levels of abstraction allow for high-level reasoning which might be im-
possible to do with a low-level logic-only approach. Given that agent
technology will develop further, this area of embedding dishonesty in ex-
isting frameworks will surely become more important than the clear-cut
modal logic definitions.
5 Open issues and conclusion
In this review, we examined formal-logical definitions of lies, deception
and other notions. Using the philosophical literature, we extracted guide-
lines that helped us to check whether formal definitions are correct and
complete. Primarily, we looked at purely logical definitions and found
some complying with all or almost all necessary conditions. We also as-
sessed a few examples of other approaches which were formally defined
but not based on pure logic. These were not as clear-cut and obviously
correct, but had the great advantage of being embedded in an applica-
tion environment. On the other hand, the modal logic definitions were
accurate and concise (at least some), but not trouble-free applicable to
applications.
In the remaining part we will look at the open issues that arise from
this basis. At first, we start by listing some issues identified by the authors
of the various papers, before adding other additional issues.
One question that seems to unanswered, as almost without exception
all authors mentioned in chapter 4 referred to it, is how to include lying
and deception successfully in agent communication and argumentation.
Although some tried, as shown in chapter 4, there is yet no widely ac-
cepted solution that would allow to use the notion of lies or deception in
practice.
Strongly connected is the question of how to detect lies or deception
in communication (e.g. pointed out by Sakama in [49]). There are papers
considering this question, e.g. in [26], but not in a formal way which
would allow to apply some detection algorithms.
A probably even more useful question is how to prevent agents from
lying or trying to deceive [47,42]. This connects to the question of how to
design agent communication mechanisms that provide no incentive to lie,
thereby enforcing honesty. Similarly, such questions have been considered
in an informal way [2] but not applied formally.
Other open questions that have been identified by others are for ex-
ample the influence of lies or bullshit arguments in discussions and if
this could lead to some form of collective irrationality [7]. Or which com-
putational complexity does reasoning about a strategy to lie or deceive
actually have and if this is a hindrance to adopt such strategies in prac-
tice [42].
An issue which has not been addressed by any of the authors is the
trade-off between simplicity/applicability and correctness. All authors
using modal logic tried to use as complicated operators as necessary to
define lies as correct as possible, whereas authors who included the def-
inition in agent design used operators as simple as possible sacrificing
correctness and conciseness. Possible solutions might need to adopt sim-
pler operators which are usable in actual agents to define the notions as
correctly as modal operators allowed. Besides simplification, unification
of different ideas to one definition instead of many different ones might
also help to apply the result in practice.
A second point which has not been addressed widely is how to react
on detected lies or attempted deception. Although this step naturally
succeeds the still open detection question, it is highly important as it
alters the way agents communicate with another. They could introduce
some kind of punishment or even ignore the liar in future encounters.
The kind of expected punishment also influences the decision to lie as it
changes the expected utility.
All in all, we can see that there are a number of open issues and pos-
sible improvements to be addressed. One can hope that these issues can
be resolved to have, one day, independent self-acting agents confidently
using lies, bullshit, deception or other notions avoiding detection, while
at the same time being able to detect dishonesties of others in an envi-
ronment that encourages honest behaviour and has clear rules on how
to react to dishonest agents.
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